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Abstract
In this paper, I discuss cases of replication in the visual arts, with
particular focus on paintings. In the first part, I focus on painted copies,
that is, manual reproductions of paintings created by artists. Painted
copies are sometimes used for the purpose of aesthetic education on the
original. I explore the relation between the creation of painted copies
and their use as aesthetic surrogates of the original artwork and draw a
positive conclusion on the aesthetic benefits of replica production by
artists. A skeptical conclusion follows regarding the use of such replicas
as surrogates for the original painting. The second part of the paper
concerns mechanically produced replicas, such as photographs and 3-D
prints. On the basis of some of the claims made in the first part, I set
conditions that mechanically produced replicas need to meet in order to
function as aesthetic surrogates of an original. I argue that perfect
aesthetic surrogates are either already available or at least possible. I
conclude by considering two possible objections.
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1. Introduction
The exhibition, Replicating Genius: Impressionism 1874, curated by
Nathaniel Dunn, was held at the Gus Fisher Gallery in Auckland, New
Zealand, from November 11-16, 2016. It consisted entirely of replicas of
paintings, from the first impressionist exhibition of 1874, commissioned
by the curator from professional artists.[1] In the curatorial notes, Dunn
writes: “Many people, myself included, do not have the means to travel
the world to look at every artwork they would like. …So how can great
art be brought to a more local environment?”[2] His answer to this
question is that replicas may provide a satisfactory substitute for the
appreciation of original artworks. Unlike printed reproductions in a book,
replicas can be the exact size of the original, or close enough to give the
viewer a better impression of the original’s size. With regard to the
purpose of Replicating Genius, Dunn states, “The ultimate goal is to
broaden art education and appreciation.”[3] It is evident from this
statement of intent that Dunn believes replicas provide some aesthetic
insight into the qualities of the original painting.[4] He is not alone in
holding this belief, as he observes, “…replication has a long history in
fine arts …. Copies and copying were used as didactic tools, and that is
how they are being used today.”[5]
Replicating Genius features two relevant aspects of replication: the
creation of painted replicas by artists and their use to replace an original.
The first part of this paper explores the relation between these two
aspects and draws a positive conclusion on the aesthetic benefits of
replica production by artists, an aspect largely ignored by the extant
literature. A skeptical conclusion follows regarding the use of such
replicas as a surrogate for the original painting in order to promote
aesthetic education. The second part of the paper concerns
mechanically produced replicas, such as photographs and 3-D prints. On
the basis of the observations developed in the first part, I set some
conditions that mechanically produced replicas need to meet in order to
function as aesthetic surrogates of an original. I argue that perfect
aesthetic surrogates are either already available or at least possible. I
conclude by considering two possible objections and concede that, at
least under one possible interpretation, perfect copies may lack one
aspect of the aesthetic experience of the original, although this would not
interfere with their use in aesthetic education.
2. Appreciation of replicas
The main reason to produce replicas is that they allow the viewer to
experience some of the aesthetic properties of the original. This goal lies
behind exhibitions such as Replicating Genius, as illustrated by the
curatorial statement quoted above. A similar function is performed by the
most common example of replication, that is, photographs of artworks
contained in any art history book and exhibition catalogues. In other
words, replicas function as aesthetic surrogates of the original. This
function is what allows them to perform their role in aesthetic
education.[6]
Different strategies may be employed to replace the experience of
originals. The exhibition, Replicating Genius, chose the way of painted
copies. Professional artists sat in front of a high-quality photograph of the
original and reproduced it as closely as possible on canvases of the
same or similar size as the original. These artists often carried out
extensive research to become more familiar with the painting methods of
the artist they set out to replicate. However, other strategies are

available. In 2006, Factum Arte, on commission from the Giorgio Cini
Foundation, used state-of-the-art 3-D scanners and printers to produce a
copy of Paolo Veronese’s The Wedding at Cana (1563).[7] The painting
has been absent from its original Venetian location, the Basilica di San
Giorgio Maggiore, since Napoleonic troops looted it in 1797. The copy
was installed in the Basilica’s refectory, the exact place intended for the
original, now in the Louvre.
It is not my aim to assess which of the available replication strategies is
the most effective. A definitive answer to this question is partly tied to the
answer to the questions of how the surrogate experience is produced
and in what relation the copy stands to the original.[8] However, the
success of the Veronese replica commands attention for the possibility of
widespread use of recent technological developments in order to
produce copies that are barely distinguishable from the original, even
upon close scrutiny. I return to this possibility at the end of the paper and
compare it with the use of painted copies.
3. Replica production: painted copies
This section is devoted to the neglected point of view of the copyist, so
far an unexplored topic in philosophical literature. For the sake of
simplicity, I will talk about copying paintings. The paradigm here is that of
the traditional copying process in which an artist sits in front of a
painting, or a suitably accurate photograph of it, and replicates it in the
same medium, or the closest one available. My claims will concern the
relation of this process to aesthetic education.
In discussing the harm made by forgeries, Sherri Irvin describes
aesthetic understanding as being essentially a bootstrapping process,
constrained by the limits of our background knowledge and perceptual
discrimination.[9] She claims that, in the absence of objective, axiom-like
principles on which to ground aesthetic discrimination and evaluation,
we are left with a framework in which our perceptual abilities are
informed by relevant knowledge concerning the artwork in question.
Such informed perceptual acquaintance with artworks will, in turn, refine
our capacity to situate works in their proper historical category, and this
will allow us to experience new artworks with renewed historical and
contextual understanding.
On the basis of this, Irvin draws two main consequences regarding
forgeries. First, forgeries corrupt aesthetic understanding, as they invite
us to search for aesthetic value in the wrong places, either because they
possess none or because the incorrect attribution sets up a network of
expectations connected with an artist’s known work. Insofar as they do
so, forgeries meddle with the bootstrapping process that is at the heart
of aesthetic understanding. Second, known forgeries, that is, forged
works that have been recognized as such, are capable of honing our
aesthetic understanding, as their inauthentic character helps critics to
focus on the differences between the forged work and the original.
Discussing Van Meegeren’s famous Vermeer fakes, Irvin claims that:
Art historians and others have gradually been able, by
looking carefully at the forgeries in relation to the original
works, to recognize the ways in which aesthetic
understanding was distorted before the forgery was
discovered, and to refine their understanding of the true
characteristics of the various periods of Vermeer’s
production.[10]
Thus, the fresh look on originals that is possible whenever a forger is
unmasked not only restores the damage in aesthetic understanding dealt
by the fake, it also positively contributes to a better understanding of the
original work by providing a perceptual benchmark against which to
judge it. In 1983, Hope B. Werness set the characteristics of Vermeer’s
known paintings and Van Meegeren’s fakes against each other in a
comparative table. Once the inauthentic nature of the latter paintings had
been exposed, it was relatively easy for a critic to spot the differences
between Van Meegeren’s forgeries and genuine Vermeers, in
luminosity, anatomical accuracy, composition, and other crucial
aspects.[11]
The upshot of Irvin’s claims for my discussion is twofold. On the one
hand, it is clear that replicas share with known forgeries the beneficial
effects on our aesthetic understanding, without posing the same
dangers as forgeries. Replicas share with forgeries the relevant relation
to the original by possessing relevant perceptual similarities, up to being
perceptually indistinguishable. However, just as with known forgeries,
they cannot deceive us into thinking they are an instance of the original
artist’s work. Therefore, they may similarly function as a perceptual
benchmark from which to judge the aesthetic and non-aesthetic
properties of the original.[12] On the other hand, and more interestingly,
Irvin’s characterization of aesthetic understanding can shed a light on
replica production, which, as I have previously claimed, has been largely
neglected in the philosophical literature on forgeries and copies. My
claim is that painting copies of artworks may foster aesthetic
understanding, in that it forces the copyist down a bootstrapping process

such as the one described by Irvin.
Consider the following example. Suppose an artist wanted to replicate
Carel Fabritius’ The Goldfinch (1654), currently at the Mauritshuis. The
painting famously depicts a pet goldfinch perched on its feeder, to which
the bird is chained. Generally speaking, two main characteristics of the
painting stand out. On the one hand, our attention is captured by the
loose and suggestive treatment of the bird’s plumage.[13] On the other
hand, the feeder has a trompe l’oeil character and is rendered with
remarkable attention to tonal values and shading. Armed with a basic art
historical understanding of the painting’s context of production, the artist
begins to paint the replica.
The overall naturalistic feel of the painting, especially evident in the
trompe l’oeil effect of the feeder, may suggest to the artist that the bird
should be rendered with abundance of detail. Upon closer scrutiny,
however, the artist realizes that the goldfinch’s feathers are painted in
rapid brushstrokes. The dark plumage of the bird’s wing is visible
through the yellow feathers on top, and the black line in the middle of the
yellow patch has likely been obtained by scratching the surface of the
panel with the tip of the brush’s handle, a technique used by Rembrandt
to paint hair curls in his self-portraits. These features of the painting
show its connection with Rembrandt’s style. Awareness of such stylistic
and historical properties of the work foster a more detailed observation
and reproduction of such features. For instance, the artist might pay
attention to the main direction of the brushstrokes in the original and
then replicate a similarly free treatment in painting the copy.
Moving on to the feeder, and having already noticed its illusionistic,
three-dimensional character, the artist pays attention to tonal values and
shading. While rendering the shadow cast by the feeder on the creamcolored wall, the artist notices how subtly Fabritius has rendered the
effect of the feeder’s local color on the overall color of the shadow. The
blue-purplish feeder and the yellowish-grey wall mix into a shadow that
almost looks green at some points. This understanding of reflected light
and its effect on shadow endows the painting with an atmospheric
subtlety that reminds the copyist of Vermeer’s Milkmaid (1657-58).

Carel Fabritius’ The Goldfinch (1654)

Remember that the bootstrapping framework described by Irvin included
background knowledge and perceptual abilities. The case I have just
described shows how these two elements interact and support each
other in the process of replication. As the artist copies the appearance of
the painting, she or he becomes more aware of the properties it
instantiates and more able to determine the artwork’s position among
other similar works. In turn, this awareness allows the artist to better
notice and reproduce the non-aesthetic features of the work that are
responsible for the aesthetic properties. However, the process of copying
the painting’s appearance always starts from a prior understanding of
the aesthetically relevant elements of the picture that are related to the
work’s classification as, say, figurative seventeenth-century oil painting.
4. Painted copies and aesthetic understanding
I have claimed that painted copies instantiate the bootstrapping process
of aesthetic understanding described by Irvin. I have also claimed that

replicas, just like known forgeries, have the potential to refine our
aesthetic understanding. From this standpoint, it is worth going back to
the issue regarding the use of painted copies as a surrogate of the
original painting. In fact, a problem ensues when painted replicas are
used for the purpose of aesthetic education on the original painting.
Recall that this is what the exhibition Replicating Genius set out to do.
According to its curator, painted copies can be a successful means to
put a vast number of people in direct contact with masterpieces
scattered around the globe. In this case, replicas are used, in lieu of the
original, for the purpose of aesthetic education concerning that original
work. The problem can be described as follows.
In order for the bootstrapping process to work, the relevant art-historical
concepts must be brought to bear on the right sort of perceptual content.
Take the case in which I examine Fabritius’ Goldfinch under the
category Dutch painting. Careful scrutiny of the perceptual surface may
reveal finer-grained perceptual qualities than the ones available to the
untrained eye. For instance, the loose rendering of the plumage will
stand out as one of the picture’s highlights. The problem for painted
copies is that it is impossible to preemptively determine what would
count as the relevant perceptual content. Potentially any perceivable
feature of the picture may be subject to finer-grained perceptual
discrimination, once the concepts brought to bear on the picture are
refined enough and our perceptual abilities have been correspondingly
sharpened.
Now, the perceptual experience of painted copies is non-trivially different
from the perceptual experience of originals. Therefore, uncontrolled
exposure of an untutored audience to painted replicas may have longterm effects on aesthetic understanding as harmful as those of
undetected forgeries. Painted replicas, when they are the sole source of
acquaintance with the original painting, face the viewer with a perceptual
surface that, in virtue of its being non-trivially different from that of the
original work, is unfit to become part of the bootstrapping process of
aesthetic understanding described by Irvin. Thus, while painted copies
may be usefully compared with the original, or with a perceptually
indistinguishable reproduction, a museum of painted copies would pose
a threat to aesthetic education similar to that of a Vermeer exhibition
constituted entirely by Van Meegerens.[14]
According to the curator of Replicating Genius, an additional motivation
for exhibiting painted copies is that they can bring to the public works
that are hard to see in person because they are owned by private
collectors or are rarely, if ever, on display. However, if it is true that
comparison with the original work is necessary in order for painted
copies to foster aesthetic education, then the detrimental effect of
painted copies may be compounded when the original artworks are not
easily accessible. If all of the above is correct, caution should be used
when painted replicas are employed for the purpose of aesthetic
education and, especially in the light of recent technological
developments, mechanically produced copies may be preferable.
5. Replica production: mechanically produced replicas
The skeptical conclusion I reached concerning the educational value of
painted copies suggests focusing on mechanically produced replicas.
The prototypical case here is the photograph. Art history books and
exhibition catalogues present us with the aesthetic properties of the
original by reproducing photographs of them. But how do photographs
allow us to experience the properties of the original? Can they always do
so? Or do they have limitations?
Robert Hopkins suggests a promising hypothesis, without endorsing it.
Photographs function as an aesthetic surrogate because they are
transparent.[15] By looking at a reproductive photograph, we engage
with the original work. Copies, Hopkins observes, share an important
feature with photographs in that they do not need to possess all of the
properties possessed by the object they depict. I can see that Mount
Cook is majestic from a photograph of it but the photograph need not
itself be majestic. Hopkins, however, has a reason to doubt that
transparency can thoroughly explain how copies allow us to experience
the original. I will return to his qualms in a moment. Before that, it is
worth observing how the use of photographic reproductions as aesthetic
surrogates does not preserve aspects of the experience of the original
that are arguably aesthetically relevant.
Barbara Savedoff has described a variety of ways in which the
experience of an artwork through a photograph is different from that of
the original.[16] A photograph often differs in size from the original, and
this means that reproductions do not occupy our visual fields in the
same way as the originals do. The surface of photographic reproduction
is glossy paper or a computer screen, and the materiality of paint is lost,
along with the importance of its texture; stereoscopic vision is frustrated
by a flat photograph that presents as two-dimensional what in fact is a
three-dimensional brushstroke; colors and values of the painting are only
shown in a fixed light. Finally, “We lose the ability to move closer and
farther away. This prevents us from discovering the tension between a

painting’s visual effect and the surface which allows that effect.”[17] All
of these aspects are arguably relevant to the overall aesthetic
experience of a painting yet they are often absent from our experience of
transparent photographs of an original artwork.
To complicate matters, Hopkins notices a problem for transparency in
photographs of artworks. Whereas in a standard photograph of a picture
we would see a picture that depicts a certain scene, reproductions of
artworks do not seem to offer such an experience.[18] It would seem,
Hopkins claims, that we simply see the scene the painting is depicting
without seeing the painting itself. If this is the case, then transparency
might be the wrong relation altogether with which to explain how
reproductions of artworks may function as aesthetic surrogates. Notice
that, regardless of how one may be able to overcome the limitations of
photographs identified by Savedoff, the difference Hopkins is pointing to
would still be present. In fact, Savedoff’s concerns with our readiness to
consider photographs as the artwork itself nicely fits with Hopkins’s
observation. Photographs of paintings limit our appreciation to an
appreciation of a photograph, as opposed to appreciation of the original
painting.
Transparency may well be the way in which reproductions of the gardenvariety acquaint us with some of the aesthetic properties of originals.
However, transparency is not enough for photographs to function as
aesthetic surrogates of an original. Regardless of this, there might still
be reproduction of such kind that would allow us to bridge the gaps
between the experience of the copy and that of the original. The
remainder of the paper is devoted to exploring this possibility.
6. Two gaps to bridge
I have so far claimed that the transparent character of photographs may
be exploited in order to experience some of the original’s aesthetic
properties. This might, after all, be the reason why photographic
reproductions play an important role in art historical studies. However,
transparency alone is at best of limited use if our goal is to surrogate the
aesthetic experience of the picture, as it does not secure a number of
important features of such experience, such as actual size, texture, and
so on.
The absence of such features has two sources. On the one hand,
transparent pictures of artworks are not perceptually identical to the
original. Their size, texture, and the way they fill the surrounding space
are not the same as the original picture. Call this the perceptual gap. On
the other hand, transparent pictures are obviously different from the
object they represent. At the most basic level, they differ in their causal
history and spatio-temporal properties. For example, Veronese’s Nozze
is in Paris, whereas its 3-D printed replica is in Venice. Because of this
ontological difference, they lack properties possessed by the original that
are normally considered relevant to aesthetic appreciation. While
Picasso’s Demoiselles D’Avignon is a groundbreaking work, no copy of
it, regardless of its accuracy, will be similarly groundbreaking. Call this
difference the ontological gap.[19]
7. How to bridge the gaps
For a copy to surrogate the experience of an original, it would mean to
overcome both these shortcomings. I will consider them in turn.
The perceptual gap. The problem with the perceptual gap is that copies
are often non-trivially perceptually different from originals. We saw this in
the case of painted copies, and we found the same problem in the case
of transparent pictures. These are, in most cases, unable to provide
various aspects typical of the perceptual experience of the original, such
as the way the painting fills our visual field or the qualities dependent on
stereoscopic vision. Moreover, the impossibility to foresee how
refinements in perceptual discrimination will influence our future
experience of pictures makes it hard to dismiss any perceptual difference
as trivial.
The Veronese replica, however, should make us pause. Although no
absolute proof has been produced that no mistakes occurred in the
production of that copy, the technology employed and the care taken are
such that even the most trained eye might not be able to tell apart the
copy in Venice and the Paris original. More importantly, technology
might soon reach a level of sophistication, if it hasn’t done so already in
the Nozze case, that will allow us to produce copies with differences in
size, color, texture, and 3-D shape that are small enough to be
undetectable to the naked human eye. I will refer to such cases as
perfect copies. A perfect copy would be only trivially perceptually
different from the original, as the sort of appreciation that is normally
appropriate in the case of visual arts does not require appreciation of
details invisible to the human naked eye, although of course such details
may be relevant when determining technical aspects, such as the
chemical composition of paints. Thus, if the perceptual gap hasn’t
already been bridged by the bold Veronese replication carried out by
Factum Arte, it is at least conceivable that it will be bridged in the future.

The ontological gap. The problem posed by the ontological gap is that a
copy, even though it may be indistinguishable from the original, is still a
different object from it and lacks the right sort of causal history. For this
reason, it cannot possess some of the properties that derive from the
original’s significance, in the course of art-historical development, and as
a member of the appreciative category it belongs to. I will examine a
strong solution to this problem and reject it. Subsequently, I will propose
a weaker, more defensible way to bridge the ontological gap.
Gregory Currie has argued that we should extend to the visual arts a
view that is standardly accepted in the case of literature. Each accurate
copy of Dickens’s Oliver Twist affords the same aesthetic experience
and counts as an instance of the book. Likewise, each perceptually
indistinguishable copy of a painting should count as an instance of the
original work. He calls this the instance multiplicity hypothesis.[20]
Currie’s proposal has also the merit of being compatible with
contextualism, that is, with the widely accepted idea that aesthetic
properties depend not only on the perceptual properties of an object but
also on the context in which the work was created and the category to
which it belongs. Under the instance multiplicity hypothesis, perfect
copies of paintings are no more harmful to contextualism than perfect
copies of literary works.[21] All we need to do is to know that the
instance we are examining is related to an action performed at a certain
time and that the artwork belongs to a determinate appreciative
category. These advantages, however, come at a price. Using the
instance multiplicity hypothesis as a way to bridge the ontological gap,
indeed, to eliminate it altogether, requires commitment to a suspicious
ontological framework that, among other things, threatens the intuitively
sound distinction between autographic and allographic art forms. For
these reasons, it is worth looking for a solution that does not entail any
controversial ontological commitment.
The weaker solution I wish to defend is the following. In appreciating a
perfect copy of an artwork, we treat the object in front of us as if it were
the original, that is, as if it had the causal history and art-historical
properties that are relevant to the original artwork. In doing so, we
intentionally disregard known differences between the original and the
copy in front of us. For instance, the original Veronese was painted by
hand, whereas the copy is 3-D printed.
Two observations are in order at this stage. First, abstracting from some
of the properties of an object in order to treat it as a surrogate for another
is a familiar aspect of scientific modeling. In this sense, the fictionalist
proposal I sketched above is just another instance of our capacity to gain
knowledge and expertise regarding an object by dealing with things
other than the object itself. Needless to say, the conditions imposed by
copies of artworks are more stringent than the ones typical of a scientific
model. Whereas the latter may differ in many respects from the modeled
object, a perfect copy needs to be perceptually indistinguishable from
the original, for the reasons outlined above.
Second, and in connection with the point just made, note that I am
limiting this fictionalist proposal to perfect copies, that is, copies that are
perceptually indistinguishable from the original. The fictional stance
towards the object’s identity, that is, the fact that we make-believe that
the object in front of us has the same causal history as the original, does
not interfere with the appreciative process and is therefore a perfect
surrogate of the experience of the original. Here is why. Recall the
bootstrapping process of aesthetic understanding where an artwork’s
aesthetic properties are determined by the way in which the relevant
appreciative categories are brought to bear on the non-aesthetic
features of the object. Such informed scrutiny, in turn, slowly influences
our understanding and application of art-historical categories. Each
successive encounter with an artwork is an occasion for our perceptual
discrimination abilities to be refined in the light of the refinement in the
understanding of appreciative categories enabled by past appreciative
experiences.
A perfect copy is, by definition, perceptually indistinguishable from the
original. Hence, no possible refinement in perceptual discrimination
would result in the perfect copy being incapable of functioning as part of
the bootstrapping process. On the other hand, the fictional stance allows
the viewer to bring to bear the relevant appreciative categories on the
perceptual content. Both aspects of the bootstrapping process that allow
the appreciation of the original to foster aesthetic understanding are
preserved under this account. Perfect copies are therefore suitable to
the purpose of aesthetic education concerning the original.
8. Two possible objections
An initial objection might be that this proposal fails to accommodate a
widely accepted contextualist view of aesthetic properties. Once more,
contextualism is the idea that aesthetic properties depend on nonaesthetic perceptual properties of an object plus the art-historical context
in which the work was created and the category to which it belongs. For
instance, the expressiveness of Titian’s reds depends as much on the

specific hue and distribution of paint on his canvases as it does on its arthistorical place in Venetian oil painting.
It might be thought that, as I take two perceptually indistinguishable
objects to be able to provide the same aesthetic experience, I am
denying that contextualist considerations play a role in determining the
aesthetic properties of an object. This, however, is incorrect. The
contextualist does indeed hold that two indistinguishable objects may
differ aesthetically. But the contextualist’s point concerns properties that
are actually possessed by the objects in question. The fictionalist stance
does not therefore clash with the contextualist framework because it
does not deny that two perceptually identical artworks may have different
aesthetic properties. It simply assumes that it is possible to fictionally
engage with an artwork while perceptually engaging with an object
perceptually indistinguishable indistinguishable from that artwork.[22]
In fact, the fictionalist stance I described here is not only compatible with
contextualism. Rather, it figures in one of the most common ways to
introduce and defend such a position. Suppose I am in front of Titian’s
Tarquin and Lucretia (1570). In order to make the point that Titian’s reds
are only expressive if considered in light of the tradition of Italian painting
in which he developed his style, I ask you to imagine the Titian to be an
expressionist work. Considered within such a tradition, Titian’s colors
seem markedly duller. One way to describe what is going on here is to
say that you are make-believe-taking the object in front of you, with all of
its perceptual properties, to have a quite different causal history and
hence substantially different art-historical properties from the ones you
know it has. This is exactly what would need to happen in order for
perfect copies to afford an aesthetic surrogate of an original.
I will now move to a second, more serious objection. A problem ensues if
I refuse to commit to Currie’s ontological agenda. His claim that a perfect
copy of a painting would result in an identical aesthetic experience as
the one afforded by the original rests on the instance multiplicity
hypothesis, that is, that from a modern edition of Oliver Twist we get the
same aesthetic experience as we would get from Dickens’s manuscript,
as they both count as instances of the work. In the case of paintings, a
perfect copy would count as an instance of the work; hence it could be
used as a legitimate aesthetic surrogate. However, if we give up the
instance multiplicity hypothesis, and embrace instead the fictionalist
proposal, an aspect of the experience of the original will be missing from
the experience of the perfect copy. This is the experience of being in
front of, or in perceptual contact with, the very object possessing suchand-such aesthetic properties.
For brevity, I will call this the aura experience, with reference to Walter
Benjamin’s much-discussed concept of aura. The crucial question is this:
Is aura experience an aesthetic aspect of the experience of an
original?[23] I do not wish to settle this question here. I will, however,
draw the consequences of both a positive and negative answer. If aura
experience is part of the aesthetic experience of art, then perfect copies
are indeed imperfect aesthetic surrogates of an original. However, and
quite importantly, they are not imperfect surrogates for the same
reasons as painted copies, that is, they do not corrupt aesthetic
understanding. Such corruption derived, it will be remembered, from the
lack of a reliable set of non-perceptual properties on which the viewer
would bring to bear appreciative categories. But perfect copies, as
shown by the Veronese case, do not present this problem. If, on the
other hand, aura experience is not part of the aesthetic experience of
artworks, then the absence of the thrill of being in front of the real thing
does not hinder a perfect copy to function as a perfect aesthetic
surrogate of the original. It may, however, be the reason why we still
want to see it in person.[24]
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Endnotes
[1] I will use ‘replica’ and ‘copy’ interchangeably to mean reproductions
that do not involve the original artist. However, it is important to note
that, in art-historical parlance, a replica is a version of a painting
produced by the author of the original whereas a copy is a reproduction
made by someone other than the original’s maker. I do not deny there
may be interesting observations to be made with regard to replicas

specifically. My interest here is to examine the capacity of a reproduction
to function as a surrogate of an original, regardless of its author.
[2] Nathaniel Dunn, Curatorial notes to the exhibition Replicating Genius:
Impressionism 1874, (11th to 17th November 2016, Gus Fisher Gallery,
Auckland, New Zealand).
[3] Ibid.
[4] While I recognize a distinction between aesthetic and artistic
properties, in this paper I use ‘aesthetic’ to refer to both.
[5] Ibid.
[6] The production of copies was and still is considered an important
pedagogical tool in the training process of Western artists. While the
practice of copying paintings may be partly motivated by its mere
capacity to improve a painter’s technique, aesthetic considerations are
also crucial in a painter’s choices regarding which works she or he
should copy and which aspects of them she or he should focus on. For
some examples of this practice, see Theodore Reff, “Degas’s Copies of
Older Art,” The Burlington Magazine, 105, 723 (1963), 241-51; Theodore
Reff, “New Light on Degas’s Copies,” The Burlington Magazine, 106, 735
(1964), 250-59; Jeffrey M. Muller, “Ruben’s Theory and Practice of the
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